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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Vincent Stewart pied guilty to one count of felony 
possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine. He received a unified 
sentence of seven years, with three years fixed. The district court initially placed 
Mr. Stewart on probation, a condition of which was to complete mental health court; 
however, he was found to have violated his probation some time later, and the district 
court revoked and reinstated his probation. Several later, the State filed a 
motion for probation violation. The district court then held a hearing during which it 
Mr. Stewart's probation; Mr. Stewart was not present at the hearing 
and did not waive his right to be present. 
On appeal, Mr. Stewart asserts that the district court deprived him of his right to 
due process by revoking his probation at a hearing held in his absence. Mr. Stewart 
further contends that the district court abused its discretion in revoking his probation, 
and in failing to reduce his sentence, sua sponte. 1 
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's argument that due process 
did not require Mr. Stewart to be present at his probation revocation hearing and the 
State's argument that Mr. Stewart cannot raise the issue of whether the district court 
abused its discretion when it failed to reduce his sentence sua sponte upon revoking 
probation because this issue does not constitute fundamental error. 
1 The issue of whether the district court abused its discretion in revoking Mr. Stewart's 
probation was thoroughly briefed in Mr. Stewart's Appellant's Brief and will not be 
addressed further herein. 
1 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts course of oroceE~dings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Stewart's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
2 
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court violate Stewart's right to it 
Mr. Stewart's probation in his absence? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Stewart's 
probation? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to reduce r. Stewart's 




The District Court Violated Mr. Stewart's Rights To Due Process When It Revoked His 
Probation In His Absence 
The State claims that the district court merely "amend[ed]" its disposition of 
Mr. Stewart's probation violation and thus Mr. Stewart did not need to be transported to 
the probation revocation hearing. (Respondent's Brief, p.7.) This is contradicted by the 
record, as the district court previously entered an order revoking and reinstating 
Mr. Stewart's probation, but several weeks after probation was ordered the prosecutor 
filed a motion to revoke Mr. Stewart's probation. (R., pp.119-1 ) Even where the 
admitted that the prosecutor filed a motion to revoke Stewart's probation, it 
still claims that the district court merely "amended" the order to revoke Mr. Stewart's 
probation. (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-10.) This position is untenable. Although the 
district court may have called the probation violation hearing a "Review Hearing," such 
does not alter the nature and effect of the hearing. During the hearing, the district court 
treated the motion as a new violation-it heard from counsel that Mr. Stewart was not 
re-admitted into mental health court, found Mr. Stewart could not perform the condition 
of probation that required him to participate in mental health court, and revoked his 
probation in his absence. (See generally 4/19/14 Tr.) Thus it was not simply a 
ministerial hearing during which the district court amended its order to correct a clerical 
error, but was in fact a hearing at which the district court found that Mr. Stewart was 
unable to complete probation as ordered, and revoked his probation. The district court 
found that Mr. Stewart could not complete a condition of his probation, yet Mr. Stewart 
was apparently never arraigned on the violation, nor did he admit or deny violating his 
4 
. The district court found, without hearing testimony to a 
violation, that Mr. Stewart was unable to complete a condition of his probation by being 
denied re-entry into mental health court. (R., pp.132-134; 4/19/13 Tr., p.19, L:1 - p.21, 
L.10.) The district court immediately went on to revoke his probation in his absence. 
(4/19/13 Tr., p.1 L.1 -p.21, L.10.) 
In its Brief, the State concedes that, should this Court find that Mr. Stewart's 
inability to be placed back into mental health court was a separate probation violation, 
the standard due process protections were not satisfied. (Respondent's Brief, p.10.) As 
the State itself filed a petition for probation violation in order to instigate the hearing 
(R., pp.120-123), it is illogical for the State to now say it was not a probation 
violation. Further, the State's claim that Mr. Stewart made no reasoned argument to 
explain how he was deprived of meaningful notice and an opportunity to be heard on 
whether he violated his probation is specious at best. As the hearing was misidentified 
by the district court as a "Review Hearing," Mr. Stewart was not arraigned on the 
allegations, and he was certainly not notified that, at the "Review Hearing," he would be 
found in violation of his probation and such probation revoked, particularly where the 
State had just filed a document that advised Mr. Stewart that he was entitled to be 
present for a hearing on whether he violated the terms and conditions of his probation. 
(R., pp.120-121.) Further, there was no opportunity to be heard, as the district court 
denied his motion to be transported, and he was not present to respond to the 
allegations or present his reasons why probation should or should not be revoked-
clearly he could not be heard if he was not transported to the courtroom for the hearing. 
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did the of his counsel at the hearing satisfy Mr. Stewart's right to due 
In its Brief, the State cites State v. Oyler, 92 Idaho 43 (1968), for the proposition 
that a judge has discretion to revoke probation should the district court determine that a 
probationer could not possibly perform a fundamental condition of his probation. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.11.) However, even in Oyler the probationer received a hearing 
at which he testified. Id. at 45, 47. Ultimately, the Idaho Supreme Court remanded the 
case so that the district court could conduct a hearing as to whether Oyler's alcoholism 
made it impossible for him to perform a condition of his probation-abstention from 
consumption of alcohol. Id. at 47. At the hearing, the district court would required to 
find whether compliance with the condition of probation was fundamental to a proper 
probation for Oyler. Id. If so, the district court could then reconsider whether he was a 
fit subject for probation. Id. Mr. Stewart is entitled to a similar process. 
The district court violated Mr. Stewart's right to due process when it found he was 
unable to fulfill a condition of his probation and revoked his probation outside his 
presence. Because doing so was a violation of Mr. Stewart's constitutional rights and 
contravened Idaho case law, Idaho statutes, and I.C.R. 33(e),2 the order revoking his 
2 Idaho Criminal Rule 33(e) states: 
The court shall not revoke probation except after a hearing at which the 
defendant shall be present and apprised of the ground on which such 
action is proposed ... The court shall not revoke probation unless there is 
an admission by the defendant or a finding by the court, following a 
hearing, that the defendant willfully violated a condition of probation. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
6 
must vacated, with the case remanded for a new hearing at which 
will be 
111. 
The District Court, VVhen It Revoked Mr. Stewart's Probation, Abused Its Discretion By 
Executing His Underlying Sentence Without Any Reduction 
The State claims that Mr. Stewart did not preserve his claim that the district court 
abused its discretion when it failed to reduce his sentence, sua sponte, upon revoking 
his probation. (Respondent's Brief, p.12.) The State thus claims that Mr. Stewart is 
precluded from appellate review of this issue, as he cannot meet his burden to show a 
constitutional violation under the fundamental error doctrine. (Respondent's 
p.12.) 
While Mr. Stewart acknowledges that he did not object to the district court's 
failure to reduce his sentence upon revoking his probation, Mr. Stewart asserts that his 
appellate challenge to the district court's failure to reduce his sentence sua sponte is not 
subject to the fundamental error test because every time a court either revokes 
probation or relinquishes jurisdiction it affirmatively, even if not expressly, makes a 
ruling as to the length of a defendant's sentence.3 Further, when a district court makes 
an affirmative ruling, that ruling can be challenged on appeal. McPheters v. Maile, 138 
Idaho 391, 397 (2003) ("To properly raise an issue on appeal there must either be an 
3 Mr. Stewart recognizes that the Idaho Court of Appeals recently issued an Opinion in 
State v. Clontz, 2014 Published Opinion No.44 (Idaho App. May 22, 2014), wherein it 
held that a defendant cannot raise the issue of whether a district court abused its 
discretion when it failed to reduce a sentence sua sponte on appeal because such an 
appellate challenge is controlled by the Idaho Supreme Court's fundamental error test. 
However, the decision in Clontz is not yet final. 
7 
ruling by the court or the issue must have been in the court 
an cannot raised the first time on "). 
Support for this position can be found in State v. Jones, 141 Idaho 673 (Ct. App. 
2005), where the Idaho Court of Appeals held as follows: 
At the end of the period of retained jurisdiction, the court may suspend the 
sentence and place the defendant on probation, or may relinquish 
jurisdiction, allowing execution of the original sentence. If jurisdiction is 
relinquished, the court may also reduce the sentence at that time. It is a 
common practice for a trial court to impose a rather severe underlying 
sentence as an incentive for the defendant to perform well in the retained 
jurisdiction program and to comply with the probation terms if the 
defendant is ultimately placed on probation. A lengthy underlying sentence 
also preserves the judge's options until such time as probation may be 
denied or revoked, when the court can decide whether the sentence 
should be reduced. A long underlying thus provides the judge a 
hedge against the uncertainty of the defendant's future performance. 
Id. at 676 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). When a district court revokes probation 
it must affirmatively decide whether or not to reduce the sentence. Even if this decision 
is not expressly articulated on the record, it is a decision which must be made by the 
court and, in the event the sentence is not reduced, it constitutes an adverse ruling by 
the district court which can be addressed on appeal. 
Further support for this position can be found in State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053 
(Ct. App. 1989), where the Court of Appeals held that: 
In any probation revocation proceeding, the judge faces three potential 
issues. First, was a condition of probation actually violated? Ordinarily, this 
is a question of fact. Second, does the violation justify revoking the 
probation? This is a question addressed to the judge's sound discretion. 
Third, and finally, if probation is revoked, what prison sentence should be 
ordered? Specifically, if a prison sentence previously has been 
pronounced but suspended, should that sentence be ordered into 
execution or should the court order a reduced sentence as authorized by 
I.C.R. 35? This question, too, is one of discretion. In a given case, the 
parties may frame any one or all of these issues for the judge's 
consideration. 
8 
Id. 1054. Thus, just as with the relinquishment of jurisdiction, after a district court 
revokes probation, it must decide whether to execute the underlying sentence or reduce 
it pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35, and this is a ruling that can be challenged on 
appeal absent an affirmative request for a sentence reduction. 
In sum, when the district court executed Mr. Stewart's underlying sentence 
without a reduction after revoking probation, it ruled adversely to Mr. Stewart, and due 
to that adverse ruling, Mr. Stewart was not required to object to the length of his 
sentence at the revocation hearing in order to preserve a sentencing issue on appeal.4 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Stewart respectfully requests that this Court remand this case with an order 
that Mr. Stewart be placed back on probation. Alternatively, he requests that his case 
be remanded to the district court for a hearing at which Mr. Stewart would be present. 
DATED this 24th day of June, 2014. 
\ \ )cl) 
SALLY)! co6LEY / 
Deputy State AppellaterPublic Defender 
4 Further, where Mr. Stewart was not present at the disposition hearing at which his 
probation was revoked, he did not have the opportunity to object or ask for a sentence 
reduction at the disposition hearing. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 24th day of June, 2014, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRI by causing to be placed a 




PO BOX 8509 
BOISE ID 83707 
GEORGE A SOUTHWORTH 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
RYAN DOVVELL 
CANYON COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
KENNETH K JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
PO BOX 83720 
BOISE ID 83720-0010 
Hand delivered to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court. 
SJC/eas 
·&-' 
EVAN A. SM 1TH 
Administrative Assistant 
10 

